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ABSTRACT:	  The	  causal	  structure	  of	  cognition	  can	  be	  simulated	  but	  not	  implemented	  
computationally,	  just	  as	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  furnace	  can	  be	  simulated	  but	  not	  
implemented	  computationally.	  Heating	  is	  a	  dynamical	  property,	  not	  a	  computational	  one.	  A	  
computational	  simulation	  of	  a	  furnace	  cannot	  heat	  a	  real	  house	  (only	  a	  simulated	  house).	  It	  
lacks	  the	  essential	  causal	  property	  of	  a	  furnace.	  This	  is	  obvious	  with	  computational	  furnaces.	  
The	  only	  thing	  that	  allows	  us	  even	  to	  imagine	  that	  it	  is	  otherwise	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computational	  
cognition	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  cognizing,	  unlike	  heating,	  is	  invisible	  (to	  everyone	  except	  the	  
cognizer).	  Chalmers’s	  “Dancing	  Qualia”	  Argument	  is	  hence	  invalid:	  Even	  if	  there	  could	  be	  a	  
computational	  model	  of	  cognition	  that	  was	  behaviorally	  indistinguishable	  from	  a	  real,	  feeling	  
cognizer,	  it	  would	  still	  be	  true	  that	  if,	  like	  heat,	  feeling	  is	  a	  dynamical	  property	  of	  the	  brain,	  a	  
flip-­flop	  from	  the	  presence	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  feeling	  would	  be	  undetectable	  anywhere	  along	  
Chalmers’s	  hypothetical	  component-­swapping	  continuum	  from	  a	  human	  cognizer	  to	  a	  
computational	  cognizer	  -­-­	  undetectable	  to	  everyone	  except	  the	  cognizer.	  But	  that	  would	  only	  be	  
because	  the	  cognizer	  was	  locked	  into	  being	  incapable	  of	  doing	  anything	  to	  settle	  the	  matter	  
simply	  because	  of	  Chalmers’s	  premise	  of	  input/output	  indistinguishability.	  That	  is	  not	  a	  
demonstration	  that	  cognition	  is	  computation;	  it	  is	  just	  the	  demonstation	  that	  you	  get	  out	  of	  a	  
premise	  what	  you	  put	  into	  it.	  But	  even	  if	  the	  causal	  topography	  of	  feeling,	  hence	  of	  cognizing,	  is	  
dynamic	  rather	  than	  just	  computational,	  the	  problem	  of	  explaining	  the	  causal	  role	  played	  by	  
feeling	  itself	  –	  how	  and	  why	  we	  feel	  –	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  –	  how	  and	  
why	  we	  can	  do	  what	  we	  can	  do	  –	  will	  remain	  a	  “hard”	  (and	  perhaps	  insoluble)	  problem.	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  David	  Chalmers’s	  (2012)	  thesis	  on	  cognition	  and	  computation	  is	  really	  two	  theses:	  (1)	  the	  "thesis	  of	  computational	  explanation"("computation	  provides	  a	  general	  framework	  for	  the	  explanation	  of	  cognitive	  processes"),	  which	  is	  true,	  but	  just	  the	  physical	  version	  of	  the	  Church/Turing	  Thesis	  (Piccinini	  2011)	  according	  to	  which	  
most	  physical	  processes	  are	  computable	  (to	  at	  least	  a	  close	  approximation);	  and	  (2)	  the	  “thesis	  of	  computational	  sufficiency"	  ("the	  right	  kind	  of	  computational	  structure	  suffices	  for	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  mind"),	  which,	  I	  will	  argue,	  is	  false	  (Harnad	  1994).	  
1.	  Computational	  Explanation.	  The	  thesis	  that	  is	  true	  is	  that	  (just	  about)	  any	  causal	  system	  –	  whether	  it’s	  a	  galaxy,	  a	  gall-­‐bladder	  or	  a	  grain	  of	  sand	  -­‐-­‐	  can	  be	  modeled	  computationally,	  thereby	  (if	  successful)	  fully	  “capturing”	  (and	  hence	  explaining)	  its	  (relevant)	  causal	  mechanism	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  other	  words,	  explaining,	  causally,	  how	  it	  works.	  	  	  This	  explanatory	  power	  is	  certainly	  something	  that	  psychology,	  cognitive	  science,	  neuroscience	  and	  artificial	  intelligence	  would	  want,	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  they	  study	  and	  hope	  to	  explain	  causally:	  organisms,	  their	  brains,	  and	  their	  behavior,	  as	  well	  as	  artificial	  devices	  we	  build	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  similar	  kinds	  of	  behavior.	  But	  it’s	  an	  explanatory	  power	  that	  physics,	  chemistry,	  biology	  and	  engineering	  already	  have	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  they	  study,	  without	  the	  need	  for	  “A	  Computational	  Foundation	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  	  Planetary	  Motion”	  (or	  of	  Helium,	  or	  of	  Hemoglobin,	  or	  of	  Convection	  Heaters).	  It’s	  simply	  the	  ubiquitous	  observation	  that	  –	  alongside	  language	  and	  mathematics	  –	  computers	  and	  computational	  algorithms	  are	  useful	  tools	  in	  explaining	  the	  things	  there	  are	  in	  the	  world	  and	  how	  they	  work.	  (This	  is	  what	  Searle	  1980	  called	  “Weak	  AI.”)	  
2.	  Computational	  Sufficiency.	  Chalmers’s	  second	  thesis	  is	  that	  –	  unlike,	  say,	  flying,	  or	  digesting,	  which	  can	  likewise	  be	  modeled	  and	  explained	  computationally	  (but	  are	  
not,	  as	  Chalmers	  agrees,	  themselves	  instances	  of	  computation)	  –	  cognition	  is	  (just)	  computation:	  
"[A]	  system	  implements	  a	  computation	  if	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  
mirrors	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  computation.	  The	  causal	  topology	  of	  a	  
system…	  [is	  its]	  abstract	  causal	  organization…:	  the	  pattern	  of	  interaction	  
among	  parts…	  abstracted	  away	  from	  the	  make-­up	  of	  individual	  parts	  and	  from	  
the	  way	  the	  causal	  connections	  are	  implemented...	  [A]	  property	  P	  [is]	  an	  
organizational	  invariant	  if	  it	  is	  invariant	  with	  respect	  to	  causal	  topology:	  that	  
is,	  if	  any	  change	  to	  the	  system	  that	  preserves	  the	  causal	  topology	  preserves	  P…"	  	  
"Most	  properties	  are	  not	  organizational	  invariants.	  The	  property	  of	  flying	  is	  not	  
…	  Digestion	  is	  not:	  if	  we	  gradually	  replace	  the	  parts	  involved	  in	  digestion	  with	  
pieces	  of	  metal,	  while	  preserving	  causal	  patterns,	  after	  a	  while	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  
be	  an	  instance	  of	  digestion…	  [M]ost	  properties	  depend	  essentially	  on	  certain	  
features	  that	  are	  not	  features	  of	  causal	  topology.	  Flying	  depends	  on	  height,	  
digestion	  depends	  on	  a	  particular	  physiochemical	  makeup…	  It	  is	  true	  that	  any	  
given	  instance	  of	  digestion	  will	  implement	  some	  computation,	  as	  any	  physical	  
system	  does,	  but	  the	  system's	  implementing	  this	  computation	  is	  in	  general	  
irrelevant	  to	  its	  being	  an	  instance	  of	  digestion…	  	  
"With	  cognition,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  implementing	  
some	  computation	  that	  a	  system	  is	  cognitive…	  mentality	  is	  an	  organizational	  
invariant.”	  I	  will	  try	  to	  flesh	  out	  both	  of	  Chalmers’s	  theses	  without	  getting	  bogged	  down	  in	  technical	  details	  that	  are	  interesting	  but	  not	  pertinent	  to	  this	  fundamental	  distinction.	  
3.	  Algorithms.	  Computation	  is	  symbol	  manipulation:	  symbols	  are	  objects	  of	  arbitrary	  shape	  (e.g.,	  0	  and	  1)	  and	  they	  are	  manipulated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rules	  (“algorithms”)	  that	  operate	  on	  the	  shapes	  of	  the	  symbols,	  not	  their	  meanings.	  In	  other	  words,	  computation	  is	  syntactic,	  not	  semantic.	  However,	  most	  computations	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  something	  (otherwise	  we	  would	  not	  bother	  designing	  and	  doing	  them):	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  algorithms	  that	  can	  compute	  something	  useful,	  whether	  it’s	  planetary	  motion	  or	  payroll	  checks.	  	  How	  do	  computations	  do	  useful	  things?	  There	  are	  many	  ways.	  Numerical	  algorithms	  compute	  quantitative	  results	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  knowing.	  Desk	  calculators	  implement	  numerical	  algorithms.	  Boolean	  (and/or/not)	  search	  in	  Google’s	  database	  can	  retrieve	  documents	  or	  data	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	  Virtual	  Reality	  can	  fool,	  entertain,	  or	  train	  our	  senses	  and	  movements.	  	  NASA’s	  flight	  simulations	  anticipate	  problems	  that	  might	  arise	  in	  actual	  space	  flights.	  If	  Copernicus	  and	  Galileo	  had	  had	  digital	  computers,	  they	  might	  (just	  might!)	  have	  reached	  their	  conclusions	  faster,	  or	  more	  convincingly.	  Appel	  &	  Haken	  proved	  the	  four-­‐color	  theorem	  with	  the	  help	  of	  computation	  in	  1976.	  And	  if	  Mozart	  had	  had	  a	  computer	  to	  convert	  keyboard	  improvisation	  into	  metered	  notation,	  ready	  to	  print	  or	  edit	  and	  revise	  online,	  humankind	  might	  have	  been	  left	  a	  much	  larger	  legacy	  of	  immortal	  masterpieces	  from	  his	  tragically	  short	  35	  years	  of	  life.	  	  
4.	  Causal	  Structure.	  A	  word	  about	  causal	  structure	  –	  a	  tricky	  notion	  that	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter.	  Consider	  gravitation.	  As	  currently	  understood,	  gravitation	  is	  a	  fundamental	  causal	  force	  of	  attraction	  between	  bodies,	  proportional	  to	  their	  respective	  masses.	  If	  ever	  there	  was	  a	  prototypical	  instance	  of	  causal	  structure	  –causing	  -­‐-­‐	  gravitational	  attraction	  is	  such	  an	  instance.	  	  Now	  gravitational	  attraction	  can	  be	  modeled	  exactly,	  by	  differential	  equations,	  or	  computationally,	  with	  discrete	  approximations.	  Our	  solar	  system’s	  planetary	  bodies	  and	  sun,	  including	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  their	  gravitational	  interactions,	  can	  be	  “mirrored”	  formally	  in	  a	  computer	  simulation	  to	  as	  close	  an	  approximation	  as	  we	  like.	  But	  no	  one	  would	  imagine	  that	  that	  computer	  simulation	  actually	  embodied	  planetary	  motion:	  It	  would	  be	  evident	  that	  there	  was	  nothing	  actually	  moving	  in	  a	  planetary	  simulation,	  nor	  anything	  in	  it	  that	  was	  actually	  exerting	  gravitational	  attraction.	  (If	  the	  planetary	  simulation	  was	  being	  used	  to	  generate	  a	  Virtual	  Reality,	  just	  take	  your	  goggles	  off.)	  	  The	  computer	  implementation	  of	  the	  algorithm	  would	  indeed	  have	  causal	  structure	  –	  a	  piece	  of	  computer	  hardware,	  computing,	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  physical,	  dynamical	  
system	  too,	  hence,	  like	  the	  solar	  system	  itself,	  governed	  by	  differential	  equations.	  But	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  implementation,	  as	  a	  dynamical	  system	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  would	  be	  the	  wrong	  causal	  structure	  (and	  would	  obey	  the	  wrong	  differential	  equations),	  insofar	  as	  planetary	  motion	  was	  concerned.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  planets,	  moving,	  nor	  gravity,	  attracting:	  it	  would	  be	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  computer	  hardware,	  executing	  a	  certain	  algorithm,	  thereby	  formally	  “mirroring”	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  planetary	  motion,	  as	  encoded	  in	  the	  algorithm.	  Two	  different	  dynamical	  systems,	  with	  different	  dynamical	  properties:	  those	  of	  the	  hardware,	  implementing	  the	  algorithm,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  planets,	  orbiting.	  (This	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  the	  two	  examples	  Chalmers	  concedes	  to	  be	  non-­‐computational:	  	  flying	  and	  digestion.)	  So	  in	  what	  sense	  does	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  computational	  model	  “mirror”	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  thing	  that	  it	  is	  modeling?	  The	  reply	  is	  that	  it	  mirrors	  it	  
formally.	  That	  means	  that	  the	  symbols	  and	  symbol	  manipulations	  in	  the	  model	  can	  be	  systematically	  interpreted	  as	  having	  counterparts	  in	  the	  thing	  being	  modeled.	  	  (Virtual	  Reality	  can	  even	  make	  it	  into	  a	  visual	  interpretation,	  for	  our	  senses.)	  We	  don’t	  even	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  computational	  simulations	  of	  planetary	  motion,	  nor	  even	  to	  the	  exact	  differential	  equations	  of	  physics	  in	  order	  to	  see	  this:	  We	  can	  see	  it	  in	  geometry,	  in	  the	  way	  x2	  +	  y2	  =	  r2	  “mirrors”	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  circle:	  Yes,	  x2	  +	  y2	  =	  r2	  “captures”	  the	  invariant	  structure	  of	  the	  circle,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  circle,	  it	  is	  not	  shaped	  like	  a	  circle.	  (Reminder:	  a	  circle	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  you	  see	  on	  the	  Japanese	  flag!)	  No	  one	  would	  think	  otherwise,	  despite	  the	  accurate	  –	  indeed	  isomorphic	  -­‐-­‐	  mirroring.	  (And	  again,	  if	  the	  algorithm	  is	  dynamically	  generating	  something	  that	  looks	  round,	  like	  a	  circle,	  via	  VR,	  just	  take	  your	  goggles	  off.)	  
5.	  Formally	  Mirroring	  Versus	  Physically	  Instantiating	  Causality.	  But	  this	  is	  all	  obvious.	  Everyone	  knows	  that	  the	  mathematical	  (or	  verbal)	  description	  of	  a	  thing	  is	  not	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  thing	  as	  the	  thing	  itself,	  despite	  the	  formal	  invariance	  they	  share.	  Why	  would	  one	  even	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  otherwise?	  We	  inescapably	  see	  by	  
observation	  that	  a	  computational	  solar	  system	  lacks	  the	  essential	  feature	  of	  a	  real	  solar	  system	  despite	  the	  formally	  mirrored	  “causal	  structure,”	  namely,	  there	  are	  no	  bodies	  there,	  moving,	  any	  more	  than	  there	  is	  anything	  round	  in	  the	  formal	  equation	  for	  a	  circle.	  The	  model	  –	  whether	  static	  or	  dynamic	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  just	  an	  explanatory	  device,	  a	  formal	  oracle,	  not	  a	  reincarnation	  of	  the	  thing	  it	  is	  modelling.	  So	  it	  is	  evident	  by	  inspection	  in	  the	  case	  of	  physics,	  chemistry,	  and	  biology	  (e.g.,	  when	  we	  note	  that	  synthetic	  hearts	  pump	  blood,	  but	  computational	  hearts	  do	  not),	  and	  even	  in	  mathematics,	  that	  the	  “causal	  structure”	  of	  the	  model	  (whether	  computational	  or	  analytic,	  symbolic	  or	  numeric,	  discrete	  or	  continuous,	  approximate	  or	  exact)	  may	  be	  the	  right	  one	  for	  a	  full	  causal	  explanation	  of	  the	  thing	  being	  modeled	  (explanation	  being	  a	  formal	  exercise),	  but	  not	  for	  a	  causal	  
instantiation	  -­‐-­‐	  unless	  it	  actually	  embodies	  the	  relevant	  causal	  properties	  of	  the	  thing	  being	  modeled	  (the	  way	  a	  synthetic	  heart	  does)	  rather	  than	  just	  formally	  “mirroring”	  its	  properties	  by	  physically	  implementing	  their	  computation	  (the	  way	  a	  computational	  heart	  would	  do).	  Why	  is	  this	  not	  so	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cognition?	  
6.	  Cognition	  Is	  Visible	  Only	  To	  the	  Cognizer.	  How	  could	  Chalmers	  (and	  so	  many	  others)	  have	  fallen	  into	  the	  error	  of	  confusing	  these	  two	  senses	  of	  causality,	  one	  formal,	  the	  other	  physical?	  The	  reason	  is	  clear	  and	  simple	  (indeed	  Cartesian),	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  systematically	  overlooked.	  This	  very	  error	  is	  always	  made	  in	  the	  special	  case	  of	  cognition.	  What	  on	  earth	  is	  cognition?	  Unlike,	  say,	  movement,	  cognition	  is	  invisible	  to	  all	  but	  the	  cognizer!	  (1)	  We	  all	  know	  what	  cognizing	  organisms	  can	  do.	  (2)	  We	  all	  know	  what	  brain	  activity	  is.	  (3)	  And	  we	  all	  know	  what	  
it	  feels	  like	  to	  cognize.	  Both	  behavioral	  capacity	  (1)	  and	  brain	  activity	  (2)	  are	  perfectly	  visible:	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  ordinary	  empirical	  data	  (observable,	  detectable,	  measurable).	  But	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  what	  it	  is	  about	  the	  brain	  activity	  that	  generates	  (causes)	  the	  behavioral	  capacity,	  let	  alone	  the	  cognition.	  	  And	  the	  only	  one	  to	  whom	  cognition	  itself	  is	  “visible”	  is	  the	  cognizer	  (3).	  So	  when	  we	  theorize	  about	  what	  causes	  cognition	  (rather	  than	  just	  behavioral	  capacity),	  we	  are	  theorizing	  about	  something	  that	  is	  invisible	  to	  everyone	  except	  the	  cognizer,	  namely,	  cognizing	  itself:	  We	  are	  theorizing	  about	  what	  brain	  activity	  (or	  synthetic	  device	  activity,	  if	  cognizing	  is	  possible	  in	  synthetic	  devices)	  generates	  not	  only	  our	  observable	  behavior	  (and	  behavioral	  capacity)	  but	  also	  our	  unobservable	  cognizing.	  	  
7.	  Cognizing	  Versus	  Moving.	  Let’s	  contrast	  the	  case	  of	  the	  brain	  and	  its	  invisible	  cognizing	  with	  the	  case	  of	  planets,	  moving,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  case	  of	  a	  bodily	  organ	  other	  than	  the	  brain,	  one	  for	  which	  the	  problem	  of	  invisible	  properties	  does	  not	  arise:	  the	  heart,	  pumping.	  The	  reason	  we	  would	  never	  dream	  of	  saying	  that	  planetary	  motion	  was	  just	  computational	  -­‐-­‐	  or	  of	  saying	  that	  planets	  in	  a	  computational	  model	  were	  actually	  moving	  because	  the	  model	  “mirrors”	  their	  “causal	  structure”	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  simply	  the	  fact	  that	  planetary	  motion	  is	  visible	  (or	  observable	  by	  instruments).	  Hence	  it	  is	  inescapably	  obvious	  that	  the	  computational	  model,	  even	  if	  it	  shares	  the	  formal	  causal	  properties	  of	  planetary	  motion,	  does	  not	  move.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  the	  computational	  heart:	  Unlike	  the	  synthetic	  heart,	  which	  really	  can	  pump	  blood	  (or	  some	  other	  liquid),	  a	  (purely)	  computational	  heart	  cannot	  pump	  a	  thing.	  (And	  note	  that	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  a	  physically	  implemented	  computational	  heart	  that	  faithfully	  mirrors	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  real	  heart	  -­‐-­‐	  formally,	  algorithmically,	  “isomorphically.”	  It	  is	  merely	  symbolically	  pumping	  symbolic	  blood.)	  
8.	  Bodily	  Activity,	  Brain	  Activity,	  and	  Cognizing.	  Now	  imagine	  the	  same	  thing	  for	  the	  brain.	  It’s	  a	  bit	  more	  complicated,	  because,	  unlike	  the	  heart,	  the	  brain	  is	  actually	  “doing”	  not	  one,	  nor	  two	  but	  three	  different	  things.	  One	  thing	  is	  generating	  (1)	  behavioral	  capacity:	  The	  brain	  is	  generating	  just	  about	  everything	  our	  bodies	  do,	  and	  are	  able	  to	  do,	  in	  the	  external	  world.	  The	  second	  thing	  is	  (2)	  the	  internal	  activity	  of	  the	  brain	  itself	  (the	  action	  potentials	  and	  secretions	  that	  are	  going	  on	  inside	  it).	  And	  finally,	  the	  brain	  is	  (3)	  cognizing	  (whatever	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  –	  we	  will	  return	  to	  this).	  So,	  unlike	  the	  planets	  and	  the	  heart,	  which	  are	  doing	  just	  one	  kind	  of	  thing,	  all	  of	  it	  fully	  observable	  to	  us	  (moving	  and	  pumping,	  respectively),	  the	  brain	  is	  doing	  three	  
kinds	  of	  things,	  two	  of	  them	  visible	  (behavior	  and	  brain	  activity),	  one	  of	  them	  not	  (cognition).	  
9.	  Turing	  Testing.	  Now	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  pinpoint	  exactly	  where	  the	  error	  keeps	  creeping	  in:	  No	  one	  would	  call	  a	  cognitive	  model	  a	  success	  if	  it	  could	  not	  be	  demonstrated	  to	  generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  –	  if	  it	  could	  not	  do	  what	  we	  can	  do.	  So	  the	  question	  becomes:	  what	  kind	  of	  model	  can	  generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity?	  That’s	  where	  the	  Turing	  Test	  (TT)	  comes	  in	  (Harnad	  2008):	  A	  model	  can	  generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  if	  it	  can	  pass	  TT	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  full	  robotic	  version	  of	  TT,	  not	  just	  the	  verbal	  version	  (i.e.,	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  everything	  a	  human	  can	  do	  in	  the	  world,	  not	  just	  to	  talk	  about	  it):	  A	  sensory-­‐motor	  system	  that	  could	  pass	  the	  robotic	  TT	  would	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  indistinguishably	  from	  any	  of	  us,	  for	  a	  lifetime	  .	  
10.	  “Neuralism.”	  Let’s	  set	  aside	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  brains	  do	  -­‐-­‐	  internal	  brain	  activity	  -­‐-­‐	  because	  it	  is	  controversial	  how	  many	  (and	  which)	  of	  the	  specific	  properties	  of	  brain	  activity	  are	  necessary	  either	  to	  generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  or	  to	  generate	  cognition.	  It	  could	  conceivably	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  true	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  successfully	  generate	  cognition	  is	  one	  that	  preserves	  some	  of	  	  the	  dynamic	  (noncomputational)	  features	  of	  brain	  activity	  (electrochemical	  activity,	  secretions,	  chemistry	  etc.).	  In	  that	  case	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  observable	  (neural)	  features	  were	  missing	  from	  the	  computational	  model	  of	  cognition	  would	  be	  just	  as	  visible	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  motion	  was	  missing	  from	  the	  computational	  model	  of	  planetary	  motion	  (or	  that	  a	  computational	  plane	  was	  not	  flying,	  or	  a	  computational	  stomach	  not	  digesting).	  Let’s	  call	  the	  hypothesis	  that,	  say,	  biochemical	  properties	  are	  essential	  –	  either	  to	  generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  or	  to	  generate	  cognition	  -­‐-­‐	  “neuralism.”	  It’s	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  my	  critique	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  cognition	  is	  computation	  does	  not	  rest	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  neuralism	  is	  true.	  We	  will	  discuss	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  implementation-­‐independence	  of	  computation	  in	  a	  moment,	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  insist	  that	  generating	  cognition	  depends	  on	  a	  requirement	  of	  neurosimilitude	  (necessarily	  preserving	  some	  of	  the	  dynamic	  properties	  of	  the	  brain).	  Neurosimilitude	  would	  definitely	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  brain	  works,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  either	  how	  to	  generate	  the	  brain’s	  behavioral	  capacity	  or	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  generate	  cognition.	  Synthetic,	  non-­‐neural	  means	  might	  be	  able	  to	  generate	  it	  too.	  The	  basis	  of	  my	  critique	  of	  cognitive	  computationalism	  is,	  however,	  analogous	  to	  neuralism,	  and	  could	  perhaps	  be	  dubbed	  “dynamism.”	  It	  is	  not	  that	  the	  brain’s	  specific	  dynamic	  properties	  may	  be	  essential	  for	  cognizing,	  but	  that	  some	  dynamic	  properties	  may	  be	  essential	  for	  cognizing.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  when	  we	  consider	  Chalmers’s	  “Dancing	  Qualia”	  argument,	  according	  to	  which	  there	  could	  be	  a	  seamless	  transition	  from	  a	  real	  cognizing	  body	  and	  brain	  to	  a	  purely	  computational	  cognizer	  with	  all	  the	  same	  causal	  powers,	  replacing	  each	  internal	  component,	  one	  by	  one,	  by	  a	  purely	  computational	  simulation	  of	  it,	  the	  endpoint	  being	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  a	  computer	  by	  its	  software	  so	  as	  to	  give	  it	  all	  the	  causal	  powers	  of	  a	  cognizing	  brain.	  
11.	  Sensing	  and	  Doing.	  Consider	  behavioral	  capacity	  first:	  Let	  us	  agree	  at	  once	  that	  whatever	  model	  we	  build	  that	  succeeds	  in	  generating	  our	  actual	  behavioral	  capacity	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  power	  to	  pass	  the	  full	  robotic	  version	  of	  TT,	  for	  a	  lifetime	  –	  would	  definitely	  have	  explained	  our	  behavioral	  capacity	  (1),	  fully	  and	  causally,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  did	  it	  via	  secretions	  or	  computations.	  If	  it	  were	  doing	  it	  computationally,	  by	  implementing	  an	  algorithm,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  also	  need	  a	  robotic	  body,	  with	  sensors	  and	  moving	  parts,	  and	  that	  those	  could	  not	  be	  just	  the	  implementations	  of	  algorithms	  any	  more	  than	  flying	  or	  digestion	  could	  be.	  	  Sensing,	  like	  moving	  (and	  flying,	  and	  digesting),	  is	  not	  implementation-­‐independent	  symbol-­‐manipulation.	  Consider	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  could	  be	  a	  successful	  TT-­‐passing	  robot	  that	  consisted	  of	  nothing	  other	  than	  (i)	  sensors	  and	  movable	  peripheral	  parts	  plus	  (ii)	  a	  functional	  “core”	  within	  which	  all	  the	  work	  (other	  than	  the	  I/O	  [sensory	  input	  and	  motor	  output]	  itself)	  was	  being	  done	  by	  an	  independent	  computational	  module	  that	  mirrored	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  brain	  (or	  of	  any	  other	  system	  capable	  of	  passing	  the	  TT).	  This	  really	  boils	  down	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  causal	  link-­‐up	  between	  our	  sensory	  and	  motor	  systems,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  nervous	  system,	  on	  the	  other,	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  split	  into	  two	  autonomous	  modules	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  peripheral	  sensorimotor	  one	  that	  is	  necessarily	  noncomputational,	  plus	  a	  central	  one	  that	  is	  purely	  computational.	  
12.	  Computational	  Core?	  I	  cannot	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  a	  causal	  split	  is	  possible	  or	  makes	  sense.	  To	  me	  it	  seems	  just	  as	  unlikely	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  could	  divide	  heart	  function	  (or	  flying,	  or	  digestion)	  into	  a	  noncomputational	  I/O	  module	  feeding	  into	  and	  out	  of	  a	  computational	  core.	  I	  think	  sensorimotor	  
function	  is	  mostly	  what	  the	  brain	  does	  through	  and	  through,	  and	  that	  the	  intuition	  of	  a	  brain-­‐in-­‐a-­‐vat	  receiving	  its	  I/O	  from	  the	  world	  –	  the	  intuition	  from	  which	  the	  computational-­‐core-­‐in-­‐a-­‐vat	  intuition	  derives	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  both	  unrealistic	  and	  homuncular.	  	  But	  let	  us	  agree	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  functional	  partition	  is	  an	  empirical	  question,	  depending	  on	  whatever	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  causal	  power	  it	  takes	  to	  
generate	  our	  behavioral	  capacity.	  If	  TT	  could	  not	  be	  passed	  by	  a	  computational	  core	  plus	  I/O	  peripherals	  then	  cognitive	  computationalism	  fails.	  But	  if	  TT	  could	  be	  successfully	  passed	  by	  a	  computational	  core	  plus	  I/O	  peripherals,	  would	  that	  entail	  that	  cognitive	  computationalism	  was	  correct	  after	  all?	  
13.	  It	  Feels	  Like	  Something	  To	  Cognize.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  to	  remind	  ourselves	  that	  we’ve	  left	  out	  the	  third	  burden	  of	  cognitive	  theory,	  in	  addition	  to	  (1)	  behavioral	  capacity	  and	  (2)	  brain	  function	  (which	  we’ve	  agreed	  to	  ignore):	  Even	  if	  we	  define	  cognition	  as	  whatever	  it	  takes	  to	  generate	  TT	  capacity,	  there	  is	  something	  the	  TT	  leaves	  out,	  something	  invisible	  to	  everyone	  except	  the	  cognizer,	  namely,	  consciousness:	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  to	  cognize	  (3).	  But	  that	  third	  property,	  unlike	  movement	  or	  secretions,	  cannot	  be	  perceived	  by	  anyone	  other	  than	  the	  cognizer	  himself.	  And	  I	  think	  it	  is	  this	  invisibility	  of	  cognition	  that	  is	  the	  real	  reason	  for	  Chalmers’s	  error	  of	  confusing	  the	  computational	  implementation	  of	  the	  “causal	  structure”	  of	  cognition	  with	  the	  causal	  instantiation	  of	  cognizing	  itself:	  It	  looks	  from	  the	  outside	  as	  if	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  a	  
computational	  model	  of	  cognition	  and	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  brain	  of	  a	  cognizer.	  And	  it	  is	  for	  that	  reason	  that	  computation	  alone	  looks	  like	  a	  viable	  candidate	  for	  actually	  instantiating,	  rather	  than	  merely	  explaining	  cognition.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  Chalmers	  is	  unaware	  of	  this	  distinction.	  He	  writes:	  	  
“[M]entality	  is	  an	  organizational	  invariant.	  	  [This]	  claim	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  
dividing	  mental	  properties	  into	  two	  varieties:	  psychological	  properties	  -­	  those	  
that	  are	  characterized	  by	  their	  causal	  role,	  such	  as	  belief,	  learning,	  and	  
perception	  -­	  and	  phenomenal	  properties,	  or	  those	  that	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  they	  are	  consciously	  experienced.	  Psychological	  properties	  are	  
concerned	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  the	  mind	  does,	  and	  phenomenal	  properties	  are	  
concerned	  with	  the	  way	  it	  feels."	  
14.	  The	  “Dancing	  Qualia”	  Argument.	  But	  Chalmers	  thinks	  his	  “dancing	  qualia”	  argument	  shows	  that	  feeling	  must,	  like	  computation	  itself,	  be	  an	  implementation-­‐independent	  property,	  present	  in	  every	  implementation	  of	  the	  algorithm	  that	  successfully	  captures	  the	  right	  causal	  structure,	  no	  matter	  how	  radically	  the	  implementations	  differ:	  
"Assume	  conscious	  experience	  is	  not	  organizationally	  invariant.	  Then	  there	  
exist	  systems	  with	  the	  same	  causal	  topology	  but	  different	  conscious	  
experiences…	  we	  can	  (in	  principle)	  transform	  the	  first	  system	  into	  the	  second	  by	  
making	  only	  gradual	  [dynamic]	  changes….	  But	  given	  the	  assumptions,	  there	  is	  
no	  way	  for	  the	  system	  to	  notice	  [emphasis	  added]	  these	  changes.	  Its	  causal	  
topology	  stays	  constant,	  so	  that	  all	  of	  its	  functional	  states	  and	  behavioral	  
dispositions	  stay	  fixed.	  If	  noticing	  is	  defined	  functionally	  (as	  it	  should	  be),	  then	  
there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  any	  noticing	  to	  take	  place,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  not	  [defined	  
functionally],	  any	  noticing	  here	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  thin	  event	  indeed…	  it	  would	  
be	  utterly	  impotent;	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  no	  change	  of	  processing	  within	  the	  system,	  
which	  could	  not	  even	  mention	  it."	  What	  Chalmers	  is	  saying	  here	  is	  that	  if	  we	  hypothesize	  that	  there	  could	  be	  two	  physically	  different	  but	  	  “organizationally	  invariant”	  implementations	  of	  the	  same	  causal	  structure,	  one	  feeling	  one	  way	  and	  the	  other	  feeling	  another	  way	  (or	  not	  feeling	  at	  all),	  both	  variants	  implemented	  within	  the	  same	  hardware	  so	  that	  we	  could	  throw	  a	  switch	  to	  flip	  from	  one	  implementation	  variant	  to	  the	  other,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  causal	  structure	  was	  the	  same	  for	  both	  variants	  would	  prevent	  the	  hypothetical	  difference	  in	  feeling	  from	  being	  felt.	  So	  the	  causal	  invariance	  would	  guarantee	  the	  feeling	  invariance.	  But	  the	  trouble	  with	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  
feeling,	  unlike	  movement,	  is	  invisible	  (to	  all	  but	  the	  feeler),	  yet,	  like	  movement,	  real.	  
15.	  Implementation-­Dependence	  Properties.	  The	  reason	  the	  flip/flop	  thought	  experiment	  could	  not	  guarantee	  that	  all	  implementations	  of	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  solar	  system	  or	  the	  heart	  would	  move	  and	  beat,	  respectively,	  is	  that	  moving	  and	  
pumping	  (and	  flying	  and	  digestion)	  are	  not	  computational	  properties:	  We	  can	  see	  that.	  (It	  is	  empirically	  “observable.”)	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  feeling,	  the	  reason	  this	  very	  same	  distinct	  possibility	  (that	  feeling	  is	  not	  a	  computational	  property)	  is	  not	  equally	  evident	  (as	  it	  ought	  to	  be)	  is	  that	  the	  
only	  one	  feeling	  the	  feeling	  (or	  not-­‐feeling	  the	  non-­‐feeling,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be)	  is	  the	  
cognizer	  (or	  non-­‐cognizer,	  not-­‐feeling,	  in	  case	  there’s	  no	  feeling	  going	  on,	  hence	  no	  cognition).	  But	  unless	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  declare	  feeling	  to	  be	  identical	  with	  observable	  behavioral	  capacity	  by	  definition	  -­‐-­‐	  which	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  declaring	  that	  cognitive	  computationalism	  is	  true	  by	  definition	  –	  we	  have	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  feeling,	  like	  moving	  or	  flying,	  is	  not	  an	  implementation-­‐independent	  computational	  property	  but	  a	  dynamical,	  implementation-­dependent	  one.	  	  For	  if	  feeling	  is	  (invisibly)	  like	  moving,	  then	  flipping	  from	  one	  causally	  invariant	  implementation	  to	  another	  could	  be	  like	  flipping	  between	  two	  causally	  invariant	  implementations	  of	  planetary	  motions,	  one	  that	  moves	  (because	  it	  really	  consists	  of	  planets,	  moving)	  and	  one	  that	  does	  not	  (because	  it’s	  just	  a	  computer	  algorithm,	  encoding	  and	  impementing	  the	  same	  “organizational	  invariance”):	  In	  the	  case	  of	  feeling,	  however,	  unlike	  in	  the	  case	  of	  moving,	  the	  only	  one	  who	  would	  “see”	  this	  difference	  would	  be	  the	  cognizer,	  as	  the	  “movements”	  (behavior)	  would	  (ex	  
hypothesi)	  have	  to	  be	  identical.	  	  
16.	  Argument	  By	  Assumption.	  Chalmers’s	  “Dancing	  Qualia”	  argument	  simply	  does	  not	  take	  this	  distinct	  possibility	  into	  account	  at	  all.	  It	  won’t	  do	  to	  say	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  felt	  difference,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  “thin”	  one	  (because	  it	  could	  have	  no	  behavioral	  consquences).	  Chalmers	  gives	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  why	  the	  state	  difference	  could	  not	  be	  as	  “thick”	  as	  thick	  can	  be,	  as	  mighty	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  mental	  day	  and	  nonmental	  night,	  if	  the	  flip/flop	  were	  between	  a	  feeling	  and	  a	  non-­‐feeling	  state,	  rather	  than	  just	  between	  two	  slightly	  different	  feeling	  states	  with	  a	  “thin”	  difference	  between	  them.	  But	  because	  Chalmers	  has	  imposed	  his	  premise	  of	  “functional”	  (i.e.,	  empirical,	  observational)	  indistinguishability	  (with	  feeling	  unable	  to	  contradict	  that	  premise,	  because	  feeling	  is	  not	  externally	  observable),	  this	  would	  entail	  that	  his	  premise	  itself	  (not	  reality:	  Chalmers’s	  premise)	  locks	  us	  into	  the	  consequence	  that	  even	  a	  flip	  from	  an	  insentient	  “Zombie”	  state	  to	  a	  behaviorally	  indistinguishable	  conscious	  state	  could	  make	  no	  empirically	  detectable	  difference.	  The	  feeling	  state	  says,	  truly,	  “I	  am	  feeling,”	  and	  it	  is;	  the	  nonfeeling	  state	  says	  (as	  obliged	  by	  the	  premise,	  but	  falsely)	  “I	  am	  feeling,”	  but	  it’s	  not.	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  I	  believe	  there	  could	  be	  a	  behaviorally	  indistinguishable	  Zombie	  state	  (Harnad	  1995)	  -­‐-­‐	  just	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out	  simply	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  having	  assumed	  a	  premise!	  (Or,	  better,	  one	  must	  not	  assume	  premises	  that	  could	  allow	  empirically	  indistinguishable	  Zombies.)	  Nor	  is	  it	  necessarily	  true	  that	  “noticing”	  has	  to	  be	  “functional”	  –	  if	  functional	  means	  computational:	  it	  feels	  like	  
something	  to	  notice;	  and	  what	  is	  on	  trial	  here	  is	  whether	  computationalism	  alone	  can	  
implement	  feeling	  at	  all,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  simulating	  its	  externally	  observable	  
correlates,	  formally.	  Chalmers’s	  argument	  trades	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  behavioral	  indistinguishability	  entails	  that	  we	  cannot	  see	  any	  difference	  between	  noticing	  and	  not-­‐noticing	  –	  feeling	  and	  not-­‐feeling	  –	  except	  if	  it	  has	  some	  external	  behavioral	  (or	  internal	  computational)	  expression.	  But	  who	  promised	  that	  the	  system	  could	  feel	  
anything	  at	  all,	  if	  it	  was	  merely	  computational?	  There	  remains	  the	  distinct	  possibility	  that	  what	  would	  turn	  the	  mental	  lights	  on	  or	  off	  would	  be	  a	  dynamical	  property	  –	  as	  in	  digesting,	  heating	  or	  flying	  -­‐-­‐	  rather	  than	  a	  computational	  one.	  (This	  is	  the	  “dynamism”	  mentioned	  earlier.)	  
	  “Demoting”	  feeling	  to	  a	  dynamical	  property,	  its	  presence	  or	  absence	  dependent	  on	  conformity	  with	  the	  right	  differential	  equations	  rather	  than	  the	  right	  computer	  program	  releases	  feeling	  from	  having	  to	  be	  an	  implementation-­‐independent	  computational	  property.	  
17.	  The	  Easy	  Problem.	  But	  does	  cognition	  have	  to	  be	  felt	  cognition?	  Elsewhere,	  Chalmers	  (1995)	  has	  given	  a	  name	  to	  a	  longstanding	  distinction	  that	  –	  unlike	  the	  distinction	  between	  sensorimotor	  peripherals	  and	  computational	  core	  –	  marks	  a	  solid	  empirical	  difference:	  The	  problem	  of	  explaining	  behavioral	  capacity	  (doing)	  –	  i.e.,	  how	  and	  why	  we	  can	  do	  what	  we	  can	  do	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  “easy”	  to	  solve.	  Cognitive	  science	  is	  nowhere	  near	  solving	  it,	  but	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  principled	  obstacles.	  The	  problem	  of	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	  we	  feel	  (the	  “mind/body	  problem”),	  in	  contrast,	  is	  hard	  to	  solve,	  perhaps	  even	  impossible	  (Harnad	  1995,	  2000).	  So	  there’s	  something	  to	  be	  said	  for	  concentrating	  on	  solving	  the	  “easy”	  problem	  of	  explaining	  how	  to	  pass	  the	  TT	  first	  (Harnad	  &	  Scherzer	  2008).	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  unlikely	  (for	  reasons	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  discussion)	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  even	  that	  “easy”	  problem	  will	  be	  a	  purely	  computational	  one	  (Harnad	  1994).	  It	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  that	  succeeds	  in	  passing	  TT	  will	  be	  hybrid	  dynamic/computational	  –	  and	  that	  the	  dynamics	  will	  not	  be	  those	  of	  the	  hardware	  implementation	  of	  the	  computation	  (those	  really	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  cognition).	  The	  dynamics	  will	  be	  those	  of	  the	  sensory-­‐motor	  surface	  –	  plus	  all	  the	  internal	  topographic	  (spatial	  shape-­‐preserving)	  dynamics	  in	  between	  (Silver	  &	  Kastner	  2009),	  possibly	  including	  molecular	  shape	  dynamics	  as	  well.	  That	  –	  and	  not	  computation	  alone	  –	  will	  be	  the	  “causal	  topography”	  of	  cognition.	  	  
18.	  The	  Hard	  Problem.	  Once	  that	  (“easy”)	  problem	  is	  solved,	  however,	  only	  the	  TT-­‐passing	  system	  itself	  will	  know	  whether	  it	  really	  does	  cognize	  –	  i.e.,	  whether	  it	  really	  feels	  like	  something	  to	  be	  that	  TT-­‐passer.	  (Being	  able	  to	  determine	  that	  through	  empirical	  observation	  would	  require	  solving	  the	  (insoluble)	  other-­‐minds	  problem.)	  	  But	  even	  if	  we	  had	  a	  guarantee	  from	  the	  gods	  that	  the	  TT-­‐passer	  really	  cognizes,	  that	  still	  would	  not	  explain	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  TT-­‐passer	  feels.	  The	  causal	  role	  of	  feeling	  in	  the	  causal	  topography	  of	  cognition	  will	  continue	  to	  defy	  explanation	  even	  if	  feeling	  really	  is	  going	  on	  in	  there	  -­‐-­‐	  probably	  because	  there	  is	  no	  more	  explanatory	  “room”	  left	  in	  a	  causal	  explanation	  (not	  just	  “thin”	  room,	  but	  no	  room),	  once	  all	  the	  relevant	  dynamics	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  (Harnad	  2011).	  
So	  not	  only	  is	  it	  unlikely	  that	  implementing	  the	  right	  computations	  will	  generate	  cognition,	  but	  whatever	  it	  is	  that	  does	  generate	  cognition	  -­‐-­‐	  whether	  its	  causal	  topography	  is	  computational,	  dynamical,	  or	  a	  hybrid	  combination	  of	  both	  –	  will	  not	  explain	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  consciousness	  itself	  (i.e.,	  feeling),	  in	  cognition.	  And	  that	  problem	  may	  not	  just	  be	  “hard,”	  but	  insoluble.1	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  Hence	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  computationalism	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  the	  Dancing	  Qualia	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  with	  no	  one	  able	  to	  detect	  their	  failure	  except	  the	  feeler	  -­‐-­‐	  while	  the	  computationalist	  premise	  pre-­‐emptively	  defines	  the	  feeler	  a	  priori	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  any	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  This	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  Chalmers’s	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  however.	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  also	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  Except	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  all	  empirical	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  to	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  were	  true	  -­‐-­‐	  with	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  being	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  causal	  force,	  on	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  with	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  -­‐-­‐	  feeling	  seems	  to	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  causally	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  and	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  causality	  is	  computational,	  dynamic	  or	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